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Abstract  
 
This chapter reviews the discussion in science communication circles of models for public 
communication of science and technology (PCST). It questions the claim that there has been a large-scale 
shift from a ‘deficit model’ of communication to a ‘dialogue model’, and it demonstrates the survival of 
the deficit model along with the ambiguities of that model. Similar discussions in related fields of 
communication, including the critique of dialogue, are briefly sketched. Outlining the complex 
circumstances governing approaches to PCST, the author argues that communications models often 
perceived to be opposed can, in fact, coexist when the choices are made explicit. To aid this process, the 
author proposes an analytical framework of communication models based on deficit, dialogue and 
participation, including variations on each. 
 
 
Science communication has been telling a story of its own development, repeatedly and almost 
uniformly, for almost a decade. The story is a straightforward one: science communication used 
to be conducted according to a ‘deficit model’, as one-way communication from experts with 
knowledge to publics without it; it is now carried out on a ‘dialogue model’ that engages 
publics in two-way communication and draws on their own information and experiences. 
This chapter examines the validity of the claim that we have been living through such a 
fundamental shift in approach, and considers the possibility that several models, including 
deficit and dialogue models, can coexist. I argue the need for clearer articulation of the choices 
being made in science communication practice and propose a framework for the structuring of 
those choices. 
  
From Deficit to Dialogue: a Story Too Often Told? 
 
The ‘grand narrative’ in public communication of science and technology (PCST) since the late 
1990s has had compelling force. It has been replayed in policy statements, in academic studies, 
in debates on public communication within scientific communities, and in public debates on 
science-society relations. We have learned, the story goes, that one-way, top-down 
communication of packaged scientific information does not work. Now science communication 
makes it easier for the public to talk back, and scientists need to listen, so that understandings 
can be developed together. 
One of the several remarkable features of this story is how broadly it has been adopted, across 
the continents and by governments, scientific societies, intergovernmental bodies, civil society 
organizations and many other interests. To give any one illustration would risk misrepresenting 
the universality of the process by which a key idea has diffused across the world and been 
naturalized. 
There are, of course, local and specific variations, for example in the naming of some strategies 
as ‘public engagement’, but the main thrust of the argument is clear and it is shared: the old, 
traditional ways are discredited; the new ways are better. The story is not just one of 
opposition—it is one of evolution, of progress from deficit to dialogue. 
After several years of repetition, the story may be wearing thin, at least as an accurate 
descriptive account of what has happened. It is, at best, implausible that scientific communities 
and those working closely with them in policy or publicity have shifted their approach radically 
over a short period. Cultural change, even at the level of relatively self-contained subcultures, 
tends to happen on longer cycles and to be more ambivalent. When the story is told in its 
British version, as one of change marked by a report from the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Science and Technology Committee (SCST 2000), the change of direction is all too neatly 
tied to the change of millennium. In fact, that report spoke, among other things, of a ‘mood for 
dialogue’ that was growing within the population over a longer time and might, therefore, take 
time to manifest itself more clearly. 
In some scientific communities, too, the ‘mood for dialogue’ was evident several years before 
the House of Lords report. In the 1990s, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 
Council (BBSRC) in Britain stated that it had devised ‘a programme of activities designed to 
enhance public access to science and scientists with a view to improving public confidence and 
stimulating open debate about science and technology’i. The council said its activities were 
increasingly about ‘mutuality’ and ‘transparency in the way BBSRC interacts with die public’. 
Thus, the keywords of the dialogue model were established in at least one important field 
before this model received broader and higher level endorsement. 
So, at the level of description, the deficit-to-dialogue story needs qualification. Indeed, it needs 
more, because in precisely that field of biotechnology and biological sciences there were 
particular pressures to open dialogue and the responses were equivocal. The widespread and 
sometimes militant social reaction to developments in biotechnology, and in genetic 
engineering in particular, could not be faced down by mere repetition of scientific information. 
A former New Scientist editor has recalled several initiatives from the late 1980s onwards to 
engage media and the wider public in discussion of the implications of then current scientific 
developments. He cites the example of the UK National Consensus Conference on Plant 
Biotechnology in 1994, sponsored by the BBSRC, but concludes that it was a ‘one-off’. “No 
one at the top of the BBSRC saw the need to develop the model” (Dixon 2007). 
In Ireland, the strong reaction from citizen groups to trials of genetically modified (GM) crops 
prompted scientists and companies in biotechnology and genetics to facilitate and engage in 
public debate, including with committed opponents of GM foods. A technology foresight report 
that contributed significantly to a radical increase in government spending on scientific research 
included among its recommendations a proposal for a ‘national conversation on biotechnology’ 
and advocated a communications strategy in biotechnology that uses a partnership approach 
with ongoing, transparent and open dialogue’ (Technology Foresight Ireland 1999). As the heat 
went out of the GM foods debate, this recommendation disappeared from view. In 2004, a 
website established by government specifically to facilitate public education and debate on 
biotechnology was closed down. 
We shall return later to consider the social and political factors that influence the adoption or 
abandonment of a science communication model. For now, we can further question the story of 
a uniform shift from deficit to dialogue by pointing to the very evident persistence of the deficit 
model. Sociologist Brian Wynne, who is strongly associated with the early identification and 
critique of the deficit model in the early 1990s (Wynne 1991. see also Ziman 1991), has 
observed the ‘multifold reinventions of the public deficit model’ (Wynne 2006). He and 
colleagues have noted that the apparent consensus about dialogue covers ‘deeper ambivalence. 
Old assumptions continually reassert themselves ... No sooner have “deficit” models of the 
public been discarded than they reappear’ (Wilsdon et al. 2005). 
Perhaps the most visible example of an unreconstructed deficit model is the work of popular 
science writer Richard Dawkins. His is more than an individual case, as his book, The god 
delusion, has been a best-seller and clearly has wide resonance in scientific and science-
attentive communities and beyond. Through his books, lectures, TV programmes and many 
other public interventions, Dawkins presents a view of science and its place in the world that 
resonates widely within and beyond the scientific communities. Although a professor of public 
understanding of science at Oxford University, Dawkins has rarely reflected on the diversity of 
publics for science, and even less on the diversity of possible approaches to communication 
with those publics (Dawkins 2006). 
He has increasingly narrowed his field of attention to a critique of religion and the obstacles he 
sees it presenting to the spread of science and reason in society. Two websites are maintained as 
a ‘clear-thinking oasis’ with Dawkins’s supportii. Dawkins calls on other clear thinkers to join 
his campaign: 
The enlightenment is under threat. So is reason. So is truth. So is science, especially in 
the schools of America. I am one of those scientists who feels that it is no longer enough 
just to get on and do science. We have to devote a significant proportion of our time and 
resources to defending it from deliberate attack from organized ignorance. We even 
have to go out on the attack ourselves, for the sake of reason and sanity. (Richard 
Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science 2007) 
Dawkins’s crusade links at least as much to the advocacy work of atheists, rationalists and 
sceptics as to any specifically science-based communities or movements. But the adoption of 
science’s cause by such interest groups has perceptible influence among scientists, both as 
individual citizens and as professionals. Scientists and medical practitioners are well 
represented in such organizations. The 13th European Skeptics Conference met in 2007 in 
Dublin under the banner, ‘The assault on science: Constructing a response’. The conference 
theme referred to the continuing rise in popularity of the complementary and alternative 
medicine sector, the ongoing battles between evolutionary biologists and the intelligent design 
movement, the increased activities of fundamentalist religious movements, the granting of 
degrees in science to students of alternative practices such as homeopathy and so on’.iii  
Other such initiatives cite postmodernist trends in contemporary culture and corporate special 
interests as further sources of antagonism to science. Sense About Science, a British group with 
many leading scientists among its supporters, is dedicated to ‘work with scientists to respond to 
inaccuracies in public claims about science, medicine, and technology’.iv The priority attached 
to this enterprise encourages a form of public communication that is inevitably didactic rather 
than dialogical. 
The Sense About Science annual lecture in 2007 was delivered by medical scientist Professor 
Raymond Tallis, who identified the uncongenial climate for science: 
... in ever more oppressive regulatory constraints, in opposition to ethical research on 
humans and animals and on responsible stem cell research, and in the credence given to 
anti-science, junk science, and to the authority of individuals who have no scientific 
training or understanding to pronounce on science. 
Even where the vocabulary has changed, the underlying assumptions may be those that inform 
the deficit model. Wynne (2006) writes that public engagement with science activities is ‘based, 
albeit ambiguously on closer inspection, on replacing the previous deficit model’s primitive 
one-way assumption about educating an ignorant public into “(scientifically) proper attitudes” 
with an alternative two-way dialogue’. He concludes that the replacement is more nominal than 
real. 
A review of the discussion of public communication in the publications of professional 
societies suggests that a deficit model remains the default option in many sectors of science 
(Trench and Junker 2001); it has its adherents among PCST practitioners and analysts, too 
(Trench 2007). 
Given the persistence of the deficit model, it seems like an act of denial to state in a review of 
approaches and definitions that ‘science communication as defined here cannot be considered 
as a one-way dissemination of information to the lay public’ (Burns et al. 2003). That review 
proposes dialogue as a means to ‘more effective science communication’; that is, to achieve 
certain ends decided at the point of origin. This suggests that the shift to two-way 
communication is partial. 
Several models of science communication, including one-way dissemination, and the particular 
deficit-model application of one-way dissemination, continue to coexist with two-way models 
that place varying emphasis on interactivity. So, while the story being told in PCST circles 
undoubtedly has value as a reminder about the limits of one approach and the possibilities of 
another, it is more normative than descriptive. The supposed shift from deficit to dialogue has 
not been comprehensive; nor is it irreversible. 
 
Communication Models in Other Fields 
 
The discussion about models of science communication links to discussions in many other 
fields in which similar problems have been posed. It is perhaps inevitable that a relatively new 
field of inquiry and practice, such as science communication, needs to rerun such debates for 
itself. But this discipline is maturing and, in the spirit of listening and engagement espoused so 
widely in science communication, this section will refer to theoretical and strategic debates 
elsewhere in communication that have a bearing on PCST. 
In communication theory, critiques of received transmission models from the 1970 had already 
focused on dialogue and conversation as defining activities, mainly because of the influence of 
German cultural critic Theodor Adorno and German social theorist Jurgen Habermas. A 
concept of two-way communication as dialogue came to form the centrepiece of a social and 
political theory espoused by British sociologist Anthony Giddens. He developed the concept of 
a ‘dialogical democracy’ as a more fully realized form of democracy and of dialogue as ‘the 
capability to create active trust through an appreciation of the integrity of the other’ (Giddens 
1994). 
The critique of mass media as one-way only had been prefigured in the late 1920s by the 
German playwright Bertolt Brecht, who contrasted ‘distribution’ and ‘communication’ in a 
frequently cited and insightful commentary on radio: 
Radio should be converted from a distribution system to a communication system. 
Radio could be the most wonderful public communication system imaginable, a gigantic 
system of channels – could be, that is, if it were capable not only of transmitting but of 
receiving, of making the listener not only hear but also speak, not of isolating him but of 
connecting him. (Brecht 1979/80) 
Adorno’s critique of the cultural industries and Habermas’s theory of the public sphere gave 
new life to the argument as it applied to media in general and to television in particular. 
Communication as a two-way process became the byword of much theorizing of media, society 
and culture. Mass media were widely seen to have contributed to the loss of conversation. 
The shift in thinking in mass communication theory and research challenged received ideas of 
the audience. Reviewing the future of the audience concept, communication theorist Denis 
McQuail noted that in the early days of communication research the audience was 
conceptualized as the body of ‘receivers of messages at the end of a linear process of 
information transmission’. But this view gave way gradually to one of the media receiver ‘as 
more or less active, resistant to influence, and guided by his or her own concerns, depending on 
the particular social and cultural context. The communication process itself has been 
reconceptualized as essentially consultative, interactive, and transactional’ (McQuail 1997). 
As digital and online media assumed a much larger place in the mass communication field, the 
notion of audience has come under greater strain, often giving way to the notion of ‘users’, 
which is drawn from information and communication technologies. Concepts of interactivity 
have been extensively debated, not only as they refer to human-computer interaction, but also 
as they refer to mediated communication processes between individuals and groups. 
In journalism studies, the late James Carey, one of the most influential academics in the field, 
posited a possible "journalism of conversation’ in the 1980s. The notion influenced a 
movement, known as ‘public journalism’ that problematized the presumed public that 
journalists addressed and proposed, as Carey put it, a more ‘humble journalism’ as a means to 
support more active engagement of citizens and politics (Rosen 1999). Rosen had to 
acknowledge that in the years ahead, there may be no people calling themselves public 
journalists’ but, by the late 1990s, the underlying ideas were finding new vehicles and new 
forms of expression in the debates about citizen journalism on the web, and about the shifting 
boundaries of journalism. 
Similar trends are visible in fields of communication more directly related to PCST, such as 
risk communication and health communication. To the received view of risk assessment, based 
on objective’ calculations of probability and impact Sandman (1987) added the imaginatively 
named ‘outrage’ to account for ‘subjective’ factors. ‘Call the death rate (what the experts mean 
by risk) “hazard”. Call all the other factors, collectively, “outrage”. Risk, then, is the sum of 
hazard and outrage. The public pays too little attention to hazard; the experts pay absolutely no 
attention to outrage. Not surprisingly, they rank risks differently. Risk perception scholars have 
identified more than 20 “outrage factors”. These factors include voluntariness, control, and 
fairness. The resulting formulation, risk = hazard + outrage, is now widely used. 
In health communication, a ‘medical model’ based on transmission of expert knowledge has 
been contrasted with an ‘educational model’ that takes account of the perceptions and 
understandings of the sectors of the population being addressed. But, reflecting the resilience of 
expert-centred approaches, Lee and Garvin (2003) criticize ‘commonly accepted views of 
health communication [as] inadequate because they imply a one-way transfer of information 
based on a one-sided relationship between communicator and receiver’. They present three 
health communication practices that, they say, all "ignore the social context of information 
receivers, and ... deny the agency and adaptive powers of recipients". The authors propose that 
‘researchers and practitioners must move beyond traditional practices of information transfer 
(based on a “monologue”) toward a more useful and appropriate concept of information 
exchange (based on a “dialogue”)’. In a concluding observation that has resonance for science 
communication, they write: ‘This change in orientation cannot possibly happen overnight, nor 
will it come without considerable changes in the relations of power embedded in the world of 
medicine’. 
Even public relations – perhaps widely perceived as the branch of communications most 
strongly wedded to persuasion, even manipulation – was influenced by this spirit. From the 
1980s, textbooks on public relations (such as Grunig and Hunt 1984) have contrasted one-way 
public information and publicity models with two-way models, whether ‘asymmetrical’ (that is, 
aimed to persuade more effectively through gathering information on publics) or symmetrical’. 
Symmetrical communication, in this context, refers to promotion of mutual understanding, 
exchange of information and negotiation of mutually beneficial solutions. 
Beyond disciplines and activities defined as ‘communication’, for example in science 
education, there is also increasing emphasis on the need to engage the relevant ‘audiences’ or 
‘publics’ (in science education, students) more actively. Approaches characterized as ‘inquiry-
based', ‘interactive’ or ‘project-based’ draw on a longer established educational philosophy of 
constructivism that stresses the understandings and experiences that students bring. Nobel 
Prize-winning physicist Carl Wieman is a high-profile exponent of such an approach, leading 
an initiative at the University of British Columbia in Canada to transform science teaching so 
that students ‘reason through ideas and argue their points of view’ (Cartlidge 2007). 
Inevitably, the trend in communication theory has had its critics. John Durham Peters noted that 
‘dialogue has attained something of a holy status’ with contemporary dialogians (a term he 
chose to rhyme with theologians) (Peters 2000). Reclaiming a dissemination model of 
communication alongside dialogue, Peters noted that not all culture is mutual or interactive. But 
he also insisted that ‘the rehabilitation of dissemination is not intended as an apology for the 
commissars and bureaucrats who issue edicts without deliberation or consultation’. 
In an observation with an obvious bearing on the assessment of dialogue and engagement 
activities in PCST, Peters noted that the adoption of more strongly audience-oriented 
communication styles and strategies chimed with the needs and precepts of marketing (that is, 
more effective persuasion of the public) and did not necessarily engender more active citizen 
participation: 
Dialogue is valuable, but it is a strict and jealous god. It is not necessarily the most 
vernacular form of political talk, but Ihe most demanding and difficult; dialogue’s law is 
not self-expressive pleasure but rather self-denying listening. Conversation is no more 
free of history, power, and control than any other form of communication. (Peters 2000) 
Peters’s critique of exaggerated claims made for conversation and dialogue is the source of a 
reconsideration of the ‘infatuation with dialogue’ in public relations. Stoker and Tusinski 
(2006) defend the possibility that dissemination can enhance responsibility, diversity and 
reconciliation and that dialogue may be based on a selective choice of stakeholders ‘who could 
reciprocate through an economic and emotional attachment1. They advocate engagement and 
reconciliation models as more authentic and more ethical than dialogue, because those models 
are more respectful of difference: 
Using this framework, we engage people or publics in communication, not in an effort 
to change them or even to change us, but because as human beings, we value our 
relationships with other human beings. 
It is perhaps surprising that a consideration of public relations practices could offer a basis for a 
critique of dialogue that implies no reversion to dissemination, much less the specific version of 
dissemination—the deficit model—that has prevailed in science communication. The specific 
terms used may not be entirely suitable, but an outline emerges of further options, in a space we 
shall call ‘participation’, where the aim is not in any supposedly measurable outcome but the 
process itself. 
 
 
 
 
Complex Factors and Clear Choices 
 
In the ‘co-evolution of science and society’ (Gibbons 1999), the pressures and trends in 
relations between science and society are contradictory, or at least not one-directional. 
This has implications for how the field of science communication models forms and reforms, 
and for how PCST practitioners and analysts see that field. 
At the level of social theory, it has been argued influentially (Beck 1992) that individuals and 
groups are engaged in the continuous negotiation and assessment of risks, many of which 
derive from the impacts of scientific and technological developments. We are, on this basis, 
said to be in a ‘risk society’. Full recognition of this would mean active engagement between 
scientists, technologists, policymakers, interest groups and others, to assess current trends in 
and future implications of developments in science and technology. 
The notion of ‘Mode 2’ science (Gibbons et al. 1994) describes a practice of science that is 
open and reflexive, where boundaries between disciplines and between science and non-science 
are increasingly porous. This socially contextualized science is assessed not only on the basis of 
the reliability of the knowledge it produces (as in ‘Mode 1’ science) but also on its social 
robustness. 
Whether such theories are taken as descriptions of current reality or as outlines of emerging 
trends, they find some support in the increasing public presence of scientists in a variety of 
advisory, consultative, expert witness, debating and other roles in which they present options 
and views arising from their professional experience and capacity, rather than packaged 
elements of proven knowledge (Peters 2008). 
In dealing with such topics as embryonic stem-cell research, energy, climate change and 
pandemic risks, science comes into contact with ethics, economics, public service provision and 
business. In those contexts, knowledge derived from scientific research is just one ingredient of 
public policymaking and public debate, and scientists are called on to open science-in-the-
making for public scrutiny. 
One factor drawing scientists more often into the public domain as ‘public experts’ is the 
growth in number and influence of civil society groups or non-government organizations 
(NGOs) concerned with matters that have significant scientific content. It has often been 
claimed that environmentalism, as it developed from the 1960s, had a specific impact on public 
attitudes to science. In many countries, the rate at which various applications of biotechnology 
have been adopted has been significantly influenced by the strength and the stances of NGOs. 
These developments have led some to advocate ‘upstream engagement’ of the public, in part 
through such organizations, in the shaping of the scientific research agenda (Wilsdon and Willis 
2004). Civil society organizations receive express attention from national governments in 
European countries that have been early adopters of dialogue techniques such as consensus 
conferences. The European Commission supports initiatives to develop such techniques in 
association with NGOs. 
Technological developments also facilitate this opening of science to public view. The 
pervasive use of internet communication for internal scientific and public communication 
creates opportunities for more interactivity between scientists and publics. It also permits public 
access to ‘backstage’ conversations between scientists, including those that negotiate 
uncertainties in science. In this way, the internet helps to turn science communication ‘inside-
out’ (Trench 2008). 
Against these trends that favour greater openness and reflexivity in science, and thus encourage 
approaches to science communication based on dialogue, engagement and participation, there 
are simultaneous trends working in different directions, or working to limit the impact of such 
approaches. 
Oddly enough, the most powerful of these countervailing trends is the very widespread, almost 
universal, public policy commitment to the ‘knowledge economy’ or the ‘knowledge society’. 
Over the past decade, this theme of policymaking has come to assume a central place for very 
many national governments and international intergovernmental bodies. A common feature of 
knowledge economy policies is the high priority they attach to science and technology or, more 
specifically (and tellingly), to research and development. 
At one level, this development appears to be a boost for science communication: scientific 
research gets more attention and resources; new scientific institutions are established, through 
merging and redefinition of existing ones or from the ground up: outreach or dissemination is 
often required of those receiving public funds. However, the limits quickly become clear: the 
knowledge at issue in the knowledge society is almost exclusively knowledge that can be 
turned into technologies, services and products. The reflective, interpretive knowledge of the 
humanities and social sciences hardly features, and the prevailing models for performance 
measurement discriminate against them. 
Even within the natural sciences, the policy view is limited and scientists wishing to secure a 
slice of the larger resources pie are obliged to fit their work into largely predetermined 
categories. The dominant discourses and policies of the knowledge society obscure science's 
cultural and social value, and science communication's possible contribution to broad social 
access, balanced dialogue and cultural completeness. ‘Knowledge’ economy/society policies 
and discourses may be promoting a new social separation of science, rather than fuller 
integration. 
The common emphasis on improving national competitiveness within a global knowledge 
economy also constrains the practice of dissemination and outreach. Across the developed 
world—and, in different ways, in the developing countries— there is perceived to be a crisis in 
the interest of young people in science studies and careers. Projections of future shortfalls in the 
supply of scientifically and technically qualified people are a commonplace of knowledge 
economy strategies. Those driving the knowledge economy look to the institutions benefiting 
from the new funds to reverse this trend: public communication is seen to serve a labour market 
purpose. Working with school students, although it may take interactive forms (because no 
other form would engage these audiences), may be most importantly about addressing a public 
deficit in attitudes towards science, and thus a reinvention of the supposedly discarded deficit 
model of science communication. 
In concert with this public policy trend, interest groups have emerged in and on the fringes of 
the scientific communities. They propose doctrinaire responses to perceived ‘anti-science’ 
tendencies in the public, or reject the proposition for equitable dialogue on the basis that it 
downgrades legitimate expertise. For example, Durodié (2003) argues against the trend to 
dialogue on the basis that it mistakenly posits that the validity of scientific knowledge can be 
democratically decided and that it potentially absolves policymakers from responsibility for 
their decisions. Durodié was vigorously contested by Jackson et al (2005), who not only 
defended the value of dialogue but extended its reach ‘upstream’, to deliberation on ‘setting the 
research agenda’. 
That discussion is a clear reminder that science communication does not come in a one-size-
fits-all model, called ‘dialogue’. And the terminology of ‘dialogue’ can refer to a wide range of 
practices and strategies. As indicated in the discussion of dialogue approaches to public 
relations, as also claimed by Wynne (2006) in relation to PCST dialogue and engagement 
initiatives in Britain, and as evidenced in the insistence of many in this field on ‘real dialogue’ 
and ‘public engagement’, the dialogue banner may be used to refer to refinement rather than 
replacement of a dissemination model. The talking-back part of ‘two-way communication’ in 
such situations may be, above all, a means to retime the talking-to; the listening may be more 
for improved targeting than for learning. In this way, there is no significant departure from 
linear, engineering-derived views of communication. The sender retains primary control; all 
that has been added is a feedback loop. 
When Hanssen (2004) says that ‘the exact meaning of scientific research can only be clarified 
on the basis of a dialogue with a broad range of social actors’, he has something more far-
reaching in mind than a discussion between experts and lay groups on, say, the latest evidence 
of public risks from high-voltage power lines. Indeed, the analogy he draws with public 
interpretation of art, and the distinction he makes between discussion of application and 
discussion of implication, make this very clear. Either the notion of dialogue has to be stretched 
to breaking point or, as I shall suggest below, we use an additional concept to encompass such 
approaches. 
The complex social circumstances I have sketched present a landscape very different from that 
suggested by discussions of a decisive shift from deficit to dialogue. They also challenge people 
in science communication to articulate much more clearly the strategic choices they are making. 
When we consider the deficit-dialogue relationship carefully, we can see that there are 
circumstances in which the ‘old’ way can have a legitimate place, after it has been weighed up 
with due care. Hanssen (2004) speaks of the challenge of ‘working on the integration of 
classical and alternative forms of science communication’. Dickson (2005) has made a defence 
of the deficit model, reflecting his own particular interest in science communication in 
developing countries. 
In his assessment of the crossroads at which science communication found itself at the start of 
the millennium, Miller (2001) noted that the then British Minister for Science, Lord Sainsbury, 
had pronounced the demise of the deficit model but warned: 
the end of the deficit model does not mean there is no knowledge deficit... many 
communications about science will still mainly be about passing on the latest scientific 
knowledge. 
Sturgis and Allum (2005) note the many criticisms of the received deficit model, considering 
them ‘in many ways valid’, but they argue that the criticisms ‘do not sufficiently problematize 
the deficit model to justify scrapping it altogether’. A report on Engaging Science, a 2006 
conference in Britain, observed that ‘in rejecting the knowledge deficit model so forcefully ... 
the narrow view of public engagement ignores the clear public appetite for information, as well 
as the empowering character of an understanding of the nature of science’ (Wellcome Trust 
2006). 
Einsiedel (2007) claims that ‘a more nuanced view of publics has emerged’: they can be active 
and knowledgeable, playing multiple roles and receiving science but also shaping it. However, 
she also cautions against overstating how far the balance has shifted between scientists and 
publics. She cites Jasanoff (2005), who pointed out that not all members of the public want to 
be ‘full-blooded cognitive agents who test and appraise public knowledge claims, including 
those of experts, according to culturally sanctioned criteria of competence, virtue and 
reasoning’. Einsiedel had earlier argued that the ‘cognitive deficit model’ and ‘interactive 
science model’ both: 
... have things to contribute to the ongoing discussions about the public and science ... 
Contrasting [the cognitive deficit model] with the interactive science model may have 
analytical value, but one thereby tends to overemphasize the stark differences between 
the two and to overlook the possibility that these frameworks may be complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive. (Einsiedel 2000) 
To various degrees, these versions of a reclaimed deficit model remove from it the presumption 
of incorrigible cognitive deficiency in the public, and the assumption that more knowledge or 
information about science means greater appreciation or support for science. 
From this brief discussion, we see that: 
• The deficit model survives as the effective underpinning of much science 
communication. 
• A legitimate case can be made for retention of a dissemination model in certain 
circumstances. 
‘Dialogue’ refers to multiple options that span a considerable spectrum. The bipolar view of 
deficit and dialogue is neither an accurate account of recent developments nor a useful guide to 
current and future practice and analysis. There is at least as much continuity as discontinuity in 
the historical trend. There are several variations on dissemination, of which the deficit model is 
just one. There are variations on dialogue, among them consultation and engagement, where 
‘consultation’ is taken to refer to dialogue set up on a relatively restricted agenda, for a specific 
purpose, and in a limited time frame, and ‘engagement’ involves a relatively open agenda, die 
content of which can change, in a process might not be strictly time-bound. 
Van Sanden and Meijman (2008) draw a related distinction between dialogue with a functional 
goal and dialogue with a conceptual goal. The ‘conceptual goal’ appeared to be in the mind of 
Irish Deputy Premier Mary Harney in a speech that proposed a move ‘towards a civic science’, 
defined as a science engaged with and invited into the national dialogue ... responsive to the 
public and worthy of the public trust’ (Harney 2003). (It is worth noting that the challenge of 
‘civic dialogue’ that Ms Harney presented to her audience of scientists, other academics and 
policymakers was not taken up.) 
The many possible approaches to PCST can be seen as on a continuum, in which the boundaries 
between neighbouring options are porous and shifting. The next section of this chapter proposes 
a framework for situating various models of science communication. It departs from the deficit-
dialogue dichotomy for all the reasons outlined above, but also in order to add a third main 
frame – participation – within which we can situate models and strategies that go beyond the 
limits of real and existing dialogue. 
 
Framework for Analysis 
 
Among recent contributions to the discussion of identifiable models of science communication 
are the following: 
• A map of science communication activities prepared for the Wellcome Trust in Britain 
identified three models of communication in relations between science and the media: 
the deficit model, the consultation model and the engagement model (Research 
International 2000). 
• In a review of scientists’ discussions of public communication, a colleague and I 
(Trench and Junker 2001) identified five models of communication that scientists 
implicitly considered available to them in their public interventions: deficit, 
dissemination, duty, dialogue and deference. 
• Lewenstein (2005) described four models: the deficit model, the contextual model, the 
lay expertise model and the public participation model. 
The precise number is not significant in itself. What matters in an endeavour of this kind is that 
the entities named are (at least approximately) conceptually equivalent to each other and that 
the distinctions between them are reasonably clearly drawn. For example, the contextual model 
may be taken as contained within the dialogue model, as implied by Gross (1994): 
The contextual model implies an active public: it requires a rhetoric of reconstruction in 
which public understanding is the joint creation of scientific and local knowledge ... In 
this model, communication is not solely cognitive; ethical and political concerns are 
always relevant. 
Table 1 shows a grid centred on a triad of models of science communication that distinguishes 
between dialogue and participation on the basis of my earlier discussion of the ambiguities and 
limits of dialogue in many of its current applications. The three models are: 
 Deficit. Science is transmitted by experts to audiences perceived to be deficient in 
awareness and understanding. 
 Dialogue. Science is communicated between scientists and their representatives and 
other groups, sometimes to find out how science could be more effectively 
disseminated, sometimes for consultation on specific applications. 
 Participation. Communication about science takes place between diverse groups on the 
basis that all can contribute, and that all have a stake in the outcome of the deliberations 
and discussions. 
 
Table 1: Analytical Framework of Science Communication Models 
 
Base 
communication 
models 
Ideological and 
philosophical 
associations 
Dominant 
models in 
PCST 
Variants on 
dominant 
PCST models 
Science’s orientation to public  
 
 
 
Dissemination 
 
Scientism 
 
 
Technocracy 
 
 
 
Deficit  
Defence 
 
 
 
 
Marketing 
They are hostile 
 
 
They are ignorant 
 
They can be persuaded 
  
 
 
 
Dialogue 
 
Pragmatism 
 
 
 
Constructivism 
 
 
 
Dialogue 
Context 
 
Consultation 
 
 
 
Engagement 
We see their diverse needs  
 
We find out their views 
 
They talk back 
 
They take on the issue 
 
 
 
Conversation 
 
Participatory 
democracy 
 
Relativism 
 
Participation 
 
 
Deliberation 
 
Critique  
They and we shape the issue 
 
They and we set the agenda 
 
They and we negotiate meanings 
 
 
We might say that these represent one-way, two-way and three-way models. The first two are 
essentially linear, and (he last is multidirectional: communication takes place back and forth 
between experts and publics and between publics and publics. Whereas the main object of 
dialogue may be the applications of science, in the participation model the concern is more with 
implications. However, as in any analytical scheme, the boundaries between categories will 
appear more definite than they manifest themselves in actual application. 
By characterizing the dominant models in science communication in this way, I am not 
proposing a hierarchy or an evolution. All three will continue to have their uses in particular 
circumstances. In an extended communication project or in an unfolding public debate, 
participants may move from one approach to another. However, as a general observation, we 
might say that communication processes become more open-ended and more open to values as 
well as facts in the transition from deficit to dialogue and participation. 
In Table 1, the three models are presented in column 3 with ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ 
associations ranged to left and right, respectively. The horizontal alignment of models and their 
corresponding public orientations is intended to indicate the relative emphasis on the science- 
or public-centredness of the process. 
In column 1, the dominant science communication models are related to established and more 
widely recognized communication models, as discussed above. Column 2 lists some ideological 
and philosophical perspectives that affect how the models arc applied in the particular contexts 
of PCST. These need more discussion than space permits here. The influence among scientific 
communities of scientism (the belief that science is the superior knowledge system and can 
provide answers to all the questions worth asking) may well be the key factor in the shaping of 
dissemination as a deficit model. Wynne (2006) maintains that scientism is the ideological 
underpinning of the common characterization of certain public dispositions as ‘anti-science’. 
Column 4 lists some known variants of the three core models of science communication. 
Introducing these variants allows us to consider more options, but also to recognize smaller 
gradations when analysing current practices. It also offers a wider repertoire for planning 
science communication initiatives: 
Defence.v  Here the public is envisaged as hostile; one example is the posture of the 
Richard Dawkins Foundation (see above), but the model can also be recognized in 
communication that focuses in other ways on ‘anti-science’.  
Marketing. Here the purpose is 10 persuade the public, for example about the drop in 
science and technology student numbers, perhaps by promoting successful scientists as 
role models or presenting science as ‘fun’. 
Context. Contextualized practices take into account the diversity of publics and of the 
ways their experiences and perceptions shape their reception of information. These 
practices can be functionalist, as in marketers’ ‘segmentation’ of markets, or more 
culturally situated, as in the consideration of PCST in multicultural societies. 
Consultation. The public’s opinions are sought by various means, with a view to 
redefining messages or negotiating about applications. 
Engagement. Here there is a stronger emphasis on how publics express concerns, raise 
questions and become actively involved. 
Deliberation. This is presented as a ‘heightened’ form of public participation, which 
calls on a wider set of understandings about democratic processes, and in which the 
public contributions about the ‘why’ and ‘why not’ of science help set the agenda for 
science communication and, eventually, for science. 
Critique. Here science is held to account through reference to other intellectual 
disciplines and cultural activities that can offer insights into the public meanings of 
science. The term ‘critique’ is used by analogy with the public processing of 
experiences and interpretations of the arts and other cultural expression. 
In column 5, dominant models and the variants are translated into terms of an implicit 
modelling, within scientific communities, of the publics’ role. This translation draws on 
discussion among science communicators and in this chapter. 
To articulate choices more clearly, as I have advocated, it would be worthwhile to develop an 
alternative model or models—looking at these processes from the perspective of attentive and 
active publics. 
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